Lightning is always seen, thunder always heard

optical.jpg

An old suggestion that crossing the visual and auditory pathways to the brain would lead to light being experienced as sound, and vice versa, has been tested and found to be false.

Nicholas Swindale, in Current Biology, 2000

Okay, so this isn’t new news, but it was new to me and too good a story not to share.

If, from birth, the information from the eyes is routed to the auditory cortex then the brain learns to see like normal – at least in ferrets, with whom they’ve done these experiments. The cortex has the potential to cope with whatever information it is provided with during development. So, it seems, the regional specialisations of the brain aren’t genetically predetermined. But a question remains: if your auditory cortex is processing visual stimuli, how are they actually experienced? The brain might be processing the information well enough to guide behaviour, but how do the stimuli actually feel? Are they experienced as visions or as sounds? Or, as Swindale puts it:

are the types of sensory processing that ultimately give rise to qualia innately determined properties of different cortical areas, or are they the secondary outcome of a general purpose learning algorithm applied to sensory inputs which have a different information content?

And, crucially, is there any way of working this out in a ferret? Is there a way of telling what a ferret’s experience is really like? Well, there is, and it involves rewiring just half of the brain – so that visual inputs to one side go to the ‘auditory cortex’ and visual inputs from the other go to the visual cortex as normal. Now if you train the animal to go left to visual inputs on the intact side and right to sounds, which way will it go to a visual input presented to the rewired side? If it experiences the visual input as most like a sound it will go right, but if it experiences it as most like a light it will go left. The animals go left – so visual stimuli are experienced as visual whereever in the brain they are initially processed.

Swindale’s review
The original research von Melchner L, Pallas SL, Sur M: Visual behaviour mediated by retinal projections directed to the auditory pathway. Nature 2000, 404:871-876.

Opposite Emotional Expressions

The Facial Action Coding System is a system for describing facial expression. It is based on 46 defined ‘Action Units’, which are each the contraction of a facial muscle or group of muscles.

So, the six basic emotional expressions can be expressed in terms of combinations of action units. Disgust is Action Unit 7 + Action Unit 9, for example.

Described in terms of the Action Unit space, each emotion must have an inverse (when all involved action units are inactive, and all action units not involved in the expression of that emotion are active).

Question: What do the Action-Unit Space inverses of the fundamental emotional expressions look like? Are they recognisable in any way as the opposite of the expression in emotional space? Does the action-unit inverse of sadness look like happiness, for example? What is the muscle-opposite of surprise, is it similar to the feeling-opposite (boredom presumably)?

Support cognitive science in Poland

A Polish reader posted the following on a previous post and I thought I would flag up for everyone here:

I’d like to invite you to participate in discussions on the new forum about neuroscience and cognitive science – http://kognitywistyka.fora.pl
It is generally in Polish but there is also an English section (the main page –> “In English”).

In Poland almost no-one is interested in cognitive science or neuroscience so we strongly need support. The forum is a part of http://www.kognitywistyka.net , the most popular vortal on cognitive and neural science in Central Europe.

Please help us to develop the forum and to propagate neuroscience and cognitive science in Poland.

If you have any questions, please contact the administrator at the address swacewicz(at)kognitywistyka(dot)net. In order to avoid abuse, you need to be a registered user to start new threads and write replies in the English section (but reading is always possible). In order to register, you have to click “Rejestracja” (at the main page – meaning: register) –> “Zgadzam siƒô na te warunki” (meaning: I agree) and fill the forms. Translation:
U≈ºytkownik – user
Adres email – email address
Has≈Ço – password
Potwierd≈∫ Has≈Ço – confirm password
Then change the value of “jƒôzyk forum”(language of the forum) into ‘english’. That’s all.

Every international guest will be welcomed warmly.

So if you’d like to talk cog sci and spread the word in Poland, you now know where to go!

the man who took 40,000 ecstasy pills in nine years

mdma2.jpg
The Guardian carries a story about a man who took 40,000 Ecstasy pills over nine years. The man sounds a wreck – paranoia, hallucinations, depression and extreme short-term memory loss, despite not having taken Ecstasy for seven years.

The story provides a good illustration of some of the methodological problems with proving that MDMA use is dangerous

  • This was an extreme case – does normal recreational use of ecstasy have the same effects, but less, or is the amount consumed by most people well within their ability to safely process the drug? Many animal studies which show harmful effects of MDMA use similarly extreme procedures – giving monkeys the equivalent of 50 pills over three days, for example. Although this demonstrates that MDMA can be harmful, the implications for ‘normal’ drug use among humans are not clear.
  • Other research, published today, but not mentioned in the Guardian article until towards the end, suggest that the side-effects of ecstasy use are temporary. The research mentioned failed to find a significant difference between users and non-users in either amount of depression or in neuroanatomical differences revealed by brain scans. But this can’t prove that there’s isn’t an effect (because absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence).
  • The man was also a heavy cannabis user (and probably other things too), although this also isn’t mentioned until the end of the article. It is hard to be sure which drug(s) caused his problems.
  • Finally, what kind of man would take 40,000 ecstasy pills?! His psychological and, potentially neurological, make-up was probably unusual before he went anywhere near the E

  • Link: ‘The strange case of the man who took 40,000 ecstasy pills in nine years’ (The Guardian)
    Link: Erowid.org pages on MDMA

    Neuroessentialism

    I’m a bit late to the neuroword party with this one, but here goes:

    Neuroessentialism – the belief in, or tactic of, invoking evidence, or merely terms, from neuroscience to justify claims at the psychological level. See also neuromysticism, neurobollocks.

    There’s a mild example of this in George Lakoff’s Don’t Think of An Elephant which is an otherwise excellent book:

    “One of the fundamental findings of cognitive science is that people think in terms of frames and metaphors – conceptual structures like those we have been describing. The frames are in the synapses of our brains, physically present in the form of neural circuitry. When the facts don’t fit the frames, the frames are kept and the facts ignored.”
    (p73, which you can also view here)

    He’s talking about frames (psychology). He’s advancing a claim that frame-incompatible facts get rejected (psychology). What do the statements ‘The frames are in the synapses of our brains, physically present in the form of neural circuitry’ add to the argument? Nothing. They do not provide any evidence nor do they even provide any information – everything psychological is represented somehow in the brain, and knowing that conceptual frames exist in neural circuits doesn’t help us figure out anything about their properties. The statements are contentless.

    There’s no need to pick on Lakoff particularly, it is just what I’m reading today. Far more offensive examples of neuroessentialism abound (Brain Gym springs to mind). This is in part because neuroscience is a technical and sexily complicated discipline, and in part because of the mistaken belief that evidence at a lower level of description somehow has explanatory precedence over that at a higher level of description (cf physics envy). Many claims about human psychology are adequately and entirely addressed at the level of behaviour with no need to invoke neuroscientific evidence. Indeed, for many psychological claims neuroscience can add little or nothing to our assessment of their truth. Taking for example this claim that frame-incompatible facts get rejected, knowing that frames are embedded in brain tells us nothing, but even knowing how frames are embedded in the brain may not be as useful as it first appears. Whatever neuroscientific facts we discovered about frames, the final judgement of the truth of this claim would rely on answers to questions such as is it true that frame-incompatible facts tend to get rejected? In what range of circumstances is this true and how can it be affected? The last word would be behavioural evidence, regardless of what information was provided by neuroscience.

    (un)emotional investment

    Here’s a spin on the depressive realism story. Shiv et al (2005) found that substance abusers and those with brain damage affecting their emotions had enhanced performance on an investment task. According to the authors of the study, the normal controls were actually distracted from making optimum decisions by their emotional involvement in the task.

    ‘The dark side of emotion in decision-making: When individuals with decreased emotional reactions make more advantageous decisions’ Baba Shiv, George Loewenstein and Antoine Bechara. Cognitive Brain Research, 23(1), April 2005, Pages 85-92. summary here

    Abstract:

    Can dysfunction in neural systems subserving emotion lead, under certain circumstances, to more advantageous decisions? To answer this question, we investigated how individuals with substance dependence (ISD), patients with stable focal lesions in brain regions related to emotion (lesion patients), and normal participants (normal controls) made 20 rounds of investment decisions. Like lesion patients, ISD made more advantageous decisions and ultimately earned more money from their investments than the normal controls. When normal controls either won or lost money on an investment round, they adopted a conservative strategy and became more reluctant to invest on the subsequent round, suggesting that they were more affected than lesion patients and ISD by the outcomes of decisions made in the previous rounds.

    Link: a related post at mindhacks.com

    These are not my beautiful things!

    Philip K Dick would have loved this kind of stuff:

    Capgras syndrome – in which the patient believes their friends and relatives have been replaced by impersonators – was first described in 1923 by the French psychiatrist J.M.J. Capgras in a paper with J. Reboul-Lachaux.

    Now Alireza Nejad and Khatereh Toofani at the Beheshti Hospital in Iran have reported an extremely rare variant of Capgras syndrome in which a 55-year-old woman with epilepsy believes her possessions have all been replaced by substitute objects that don’t belong to her. When she buys something new, she immediately feels that it has been replaced.

    More on this, and other research news, at the BPS Research Digest (written by Christian Jarret)

    Why can’t we choose what makes us happy?

    This from Hsee, C. K. & Hastie, R. (2006). Decision and experience: Why don’t we choose what makes us happy? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(1), 31-37


    Another common belief is that more choice options are always better. In reality, having more options can lead to worse experiences. For example, if employees are given a free trip to Paris, they are happy; if they are given a free trip to Hawaii, they are happy. But if they are given a choice between the two trips, they will be less happy, no matter which option they choose. Having the choice highlights the relative deficiencies in each option. People who choose Paris complain that ‘Paris does not have the ocean’, whereas people who choose Hawaii complain that ‘Hawaii does not have great museums’ .

    (my emphasis)

    The reference is:
    Luce, M.K. et al. (2001) The impact of emotional tradeoff difficulty on decision behavior. In Conflict and Tradeoffs in Decision Making (Weber, E.U. and Baron, J., eds), pp. 86–109, Cambridge University Press

    Seems opportunity cost isn’t just something that bothers economists!

    the endowment effect & marketing

    The endowment effect is that we value more highly what we already have. It’s a variation on the status quo bias that we talk about in Mind Hacks (Hack #74). This cognitive bias is of particular interest to economists, because it has implications for how eonomies work. If it is strongly in effect then people will trade less than is required to bring about the optimal resource allocation that free market’s are theoretically capable of. The most famous demonstration of the endowment effect directly addresses the operation of the endowment effect in a market trading situation [1] – showing that even though preferences for a small arbitrary item (a coffee mug) are randomly distributed, if you give half of the group one and allow them to trade less trading happens than you would predict. In other words more people want to hold on to their mug now they’ve got one, than people without a mug want to get hold of one. The preferences of the group have been realigned according to initial resource distribution.

    This is all relevant to marketing, as well as economics of course. You can see why car-salespeople are keen for you to take a test-drive before you purchase, or why shops are happy to offer a money-back-with-no-questions-asked option. You figure the money-back option into your cost-benefit calculation about whether to take something home, but once you’ve got it home your preferences realign – that item is now “yours”, so you’re far less likely to take it back to the shop, even if it doesn’t turn out to be as good as you thought when you bought it.

    Refs and Links:

    [1] Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch and R.H. Thaler (1990). Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy. link
    Wikipedia: The Endowment effect: : link
    Experienced traders can overcome the endowment effect : Economist article
    References at behaviouralfinance.net

    [Cross-posted at idiolect.org.uk]

    A quick and miscellaneous list of advertising links

    Metafiler: “Why do companies advertise?”

    Stayfree’s media literacy curriculum

    Vaughan on Mindhacks.com does some smackdown on neuromarketing

    Guardian special report on loyalty cards

    A brief guide to the concept of ‘priming’

    Three from the BPS research digest:
    When sex doesn’t sell (either because it distracts or provokes negative associations)

    Experimental confirmation that music affects the power of (political adverts)

    looking for the best option, rather than a good enough option can make you unhappy

    Pledgebank: art not ads

    Icarus Diving on my decoding advertisements post

    Experienced traders seem to overcome the endowement effect (a common cogntiive bias)

    Consciousness exists to make itself unnecessary

    While we’re thinking about the nature of free conscious choice, this is extremely relevant. John Bargh, in this chapter – Bypassing the Will: Towards Demystifying the Nonconscious Control of Social Behavior [1] – takes evidence from several different subdisciplines and argues that consciousness – that thing which gives us our experience of deliberate control – exists exactly to make automatic, ‘unwilled’, behaviours possible.

    Bargh talks about cases where the individual’s behavior is being “controlled” by external stimuli, not by his or her own consciously-accessible intentions or acts of will. and they are not aware of the true causes of their behavior. These exist, he says, not despite conscious control, but because of it


    In a very real sense, then, the purpose of consciousness — why it evolved — may be for the assemblage of complex nonconscious skills. In harmony with the general plasticity of human brain development, people have the capability of building ever more complex automatic ‚Äúdemons‚Äù that fit their own idiosyncratic environment, needs, and purposes. As William James (1890) argued, consciousness drops out of those processes where it is no longer needed, freeing itself for where it is…Intriguingly, then, one of the primary objectives of conscious processing may be to eliminate the need for itself in the future by making learned skills as automatic as possible. It would be ironic indeed if, given the current juxtaposition of automatic and conscious mental processes in the field of psychology, the evolved purpose of consciousness turns out to be the creation of ever more complex nonconscious processes.

    [1] Bypassing the Will: Towards Demystifying the Nonconscious Control of Social Behavior by John Bargh (2004), in The New Unconscious; ed. R. Hassin, J. Uleman, & J. Bargh. Oxford University Press.

    Does advertising erode free will

    Ah…now here’s the nub of the argument: advertisements erode free will, they are manipulations designed to subvert conscious judgement (I paraphrase Clay Shirky at Edge.org). Shirky mentions one particular judgement bias, that of super-sizing, but the general form of bias should be familiar to anyone who has been reading Mind Hacks, and/or my recent posts about advertising (like this one). Quoting Shirky


    Consider the phenomenon of ‘super-sizing’, where a restaurant patron is offered the chance to increase the portion size of their meal for some small amount of money. This presents a curious problem for the concept of free will ‚Äî the patron has already made a calculation about the amount of money they are willing to pay in return for a particular amount of food. However, when the question is re-asked, ‚Äî not “Would you pay $5.79 for this total amount of food?” but “Would you pay an additional 30 cents for more french fries?” ‚Äî patrons often say yes, despite having answered “No” moments before to an economically identical question. Super-sizing is expressly designed to subvert conscious judgment, and it works.

    Shirky believes this is much more serious than just unfair advertising.

    Our legal, political, and economic systems, the mechanisms that run modern society, all assume that people are uniformly capable of consciously modulating their behaviors…[These] days are now ending, and everyone from advertisers to political consultants increasingly understands, in voluminous biological detail, how to manipulate consciousness in ways that weaken our notion of free will.

    In the coming decades, our concept of free will, based as it is on ignorance of its actual mechanisms, will be destroyed by what we learn about the actual workings of the brain

    Previously I argued that creating changes in people’s behaviour didn’t necessarily mean that people were being coerced, or that their will was being taken away from them. The demonstration of influences on behaviour doesn’t knock down any strong version of free will – the kind of free will which is entirely unaffected by anything else doesn’t seem like a variety of free will worth wanting.

    People faced a similar dilemma in the nineteenth century when statistics were first compiled of suicides. If we can predict from census records that the number of suicides in a parish in a year will be around seven, where does that leave the free will of those who ‘choose’ to kill themselves that year? Are you taking away the freedom of the seven people who now have to die to fulfil your prediction? (Philip Ball discusses the science and philosophy of this in his book, Critical Mass). Most people, now, would probably be happy to say that just calculating the statistic doesn’t effect anything. But with the case of interventions – either marketing strategies or psychology experiments – which have the explicit purpose of changing behaviour, it isn’t so clear that we can happily say that individual freedom isn’t being unfairly manipulated. Cialdini’s point about suicide contagion makes me worry that there is no clear line between persuasion and coercion, between biasing people’s judgements in small ways, over unimportant decisions, and fundamentally changing the way people make decisions about some of the most important things in life.

    I’m happy to throw my hands up at this point and say I’ve no idea what the right way to resolve this is. Free will seems to dissolve as you draw away from it – as an individual I don’t feel manipulated, but when i look at other people – especially groups of other people, it seems like I can see manipulation going on. Has anyone got any useful conceptual structures I can borrow to see me through this?

    the price is right regardless of the cost

    Zac at ortholog.com writes about an experimental test of buying irrationality using Ebay. Quoting:


    Test auctions on eBay showed that most people prefer to pay a low price for an item and also pay postage (American: "shipping") than pay a higher price and get free postage, even when the former added up to more than the latter. A CD for $5+$6 postage is preferred to a CD for $10+freepost. It wasn’t presented as that stark a choice: multiple auctions with different price-postage ratios revealed a net preference for low item price and a poor correlation between auction success and stated postage costs. Interesting but hardly surprising: the salience of the price is greater than the cost of shipping (the anchoring cognitive fallacy), and people in general are not as rational or systematic as they/we believe.

    (Zac’s links. read the full post here)

    In Influence, Cialdini highlights scarcity as one of the six principle factors of persuasion. In an auction they combine particularly strongly: scarcity of time (the item is only on sale for a limited period), scarity of product (items are sold individually, not just as one-of-many ‘off the shelf’) and competition (from other buyers). Add to this heady mix the price/postage sleight of hand and it is no wonder you get choice irrationalities.

    Influence (by Robert Cialdini)

    Influence by Robert Cialdini is an excellent, excellent, book. Not only does it present voluminous evidence on the social psychology of persuasion and compliance, but it does succinctly and engagingly, mixing academic references with historical vignettes and personal anecdotes. The book discuss how techniques of persuasion work, grouping them under six major headings, and for each heading the book provides a ‘defence against’ section detailing how to stop yourself being unduly influenced. The final, glorious, touch is that in order to write the book Cialdini – who is a professor of social psychology – engaged in a three-year project of going undercover to explore first-hand how techniques of persuasion are used in the real world: applying for a waiter’s job to study how to increase customers’ tipping, attending tupperware parties, going on training programmes with door-to-door salesmen…it makes the book a wonderful blend of thorough research and astutely observed practice.

    The book has been extensively and excellently summarised here, at happening-here.blogspot.com, so I’m just going to pull out some particularly fun examples of persuasion techniques, particularly as the relate to advertising and marketing.

    Notes on Cialdini, R.B. (2001). Influence: Science and Practice. Forth Edition. Allyn & Bacon

    A key idea is that we all use various cognitive ‘shortcuts’ (heuristics) we use to decide on what to buy. Advertisers can take advantage of these short-cuts to skew our behaviour. For example, there is a price-as-an-indicator-of-quality heurstic which means, if we’re not thinking carefully about a purchase decision, we might just use the assumption that ‚Äúbetter things are more expensive‚Äù, so if we want a ‘better’ thing we will just look at the prices to work out which product is better.

    [Chivas Regal Scotch Whiskey] “had been a struggling brand until its managers decided to raise its price to a level far above its competitors. Sales skyrocketed, even though nothing was changed in the product itself (Aaker, 1991)” [1]

    Or the coupons-give-you-a-bargain heuristic:

    “A tire company found that mailed-out coupons which, because of a printing error, offered no savings top recipients produced just as much customers response as did error-free coupons that offered substantial savings” [2]

    It’s easy enough to think of other common examples – supermarkets which use three for the price of two offers, or put up signs saying things like “Two for ¬£1”. Next time you see one of these check the price for how much just one costs – it might stem your enthusiasm for the seeming bargain you thought you were being offered

    Here’s another trick, which takes advantage of another natural inclination – that of sticking by our word. Cialdini accuses toy producers of undersupplying stores with ‘craze’ toys just before Christmas – after a barrage of advertising parents promise their kids the toy but then can’t get hold of one. They buy them a substitute at Christmas and then also have to buy the craze toy in January. He cites the example of the Cabbage Patch Kids, dolls which were heavily advertised one year in the mid-1980s, and undersupplied during the holiday season. $25 toys were selling at auction for $700. (A charge was later brought against company for advertising something that was unavailable). In 1988, a spokesperson for Hasbo, which made the Furby toy (which also sold out at Christmas), advised parents to say I’ll try, but if I can’t get it for you now, I’ll get it for you later [3]

    The same consistency principle lies behind the advice an encyclopaedia company gives during its sales-program: make the customs fill out the sales agreements themselves. Once they’ve ‘owned’ the action by doing it themselves they are far more likely to stick by it. (“There is something magical about writing things down” says Amway Corporation literature). Cialdini explains the popularity (with companies) of testimonial contests ‚Äì those where you think of 50 words why the product is good and stand a chance of winning something. The contest is not for the company to get a single winning entry, but for them to induce all the entrants of the competition to enhance their commitment to the product by writing a testimonial. Influence has an extended discussion of this, and how the power of small, initial, public voluntary actions can be used to produce later compliance to much larger requests for action

    “Commitment decisions, even erroneous ones, have a tendency to be self-perpetuating because they can ‘grow their own legs'”
    (page 97)

    “You can use small commitments to manipulate a person’s self-image; you can use them to turn citizens into “public servants”, prospects into “customers”, prisoners into “collaborators.” And once you’ve got a man’s self-image where you want it, he should comply naturally with a whole range of your requests that are consistent with this view of himself”.
    (page 74)

    “…compliance professionals love commitments that produce inner change. First, that change is not just specific to the situation where it first occurred; it covers a whole range of related situations, too. Second, the effects of the change are lasting. So, once a man has been induced to take action that shifts his self-image to that of, let’s say, a public spirited citizen [or a guru’s disciple], he is likely to be public-spirited in a variety of other circumstances where his compliance may also be desired, and he is likely to continue his public-spirited behavior for as long as his new self-image holds.”
    (page 84)

    Social proof (social influence) is another extremely strong heuristic: “if everyone else is doing it, I should do it to”

    This too can be used unfairly – for example Evangelist Billy Graham has been known to ‘seed’ visits to towns in advance so that his arrival is met an outpouring of thousands of the faithful – apparently spontaneous, but actually highly organised. (p 101)

    Positive association is also a powerful, and potentially automatic (see also) decision -shortcut

    In one study, men who saw a new-car ad that included a seductive young woman model rated the car as faster, more appealing, more expensive-looking, and better designed than did men who viewed the same ad without the model. Yet when asked later, the men refused to believe that the presence of the young woman had influenced their judgments. [4]

    The same kind of, automatic associations, lie behind findings that people leave larger tips if paying by credit card (credit cards associated with big spending, not always with paying back) and that “that when asked to contribute to charity (the United Way), college students were markedly more likely to give money if the room they were in contained MasterCard insignias than if it did not (87 percent verses 33 percent).” (p164). Funnily enough this didn’t hold for people with troubled credit histories!

    Cialdini is quite clear that we can’t avoid using these short-cuts – after all they work most of the time – but we must come down hard on those who exploit them

    “The pace of modern life demands that we frequently use shortcuts” (p. 234)

    “We are likely to use these lone cues when we don’t have the inclination, time, energy, or cognitive resources to undertake a complete analysis of the situation. When we are rushed, stressed, uncertain, indifferent, distracted or fatigue, we tend to focus less on the information available to us. When making decisions under these circumstances, we often revert to the rather primitive but necessary single-piece-of-good-evidence approach.” (p235)

    “The real treachery, and what we cannot tolerate, is any attempt to make a profit in a way that threatens the reliability of our shortcuts” (p. 239)

    I don’t know how realistic this kind of individual/consumer vigilance is as a strategy, but Cialdini seems to believe that the only alternative is to change the whole pace of modern life

    The evidence suggests that the ever-accelerating pace and informational crush of modern life will make this particular form of unthinking compliance [shortcuts] more and more prevalent in the future (introduction, p. x.)

    My default assumption used to be that the careless use of decision heuristics probably only applies to unimportant decisions. This took quite a severe knock from Cialdini’s discussion on the social-contagion of suicide [5]. If people can be influenced by publicity about a suicide to kill themselves (and all the evidence is that they are – and social proof is one of Cialdini’s six discussed shortcuts), then all of the decisions we make in life are open to be exploited by irrational factors under the control of others.

    Refs below the fold

    Continue reading “Influence (by Robert Cialdini)”

    where do implicit associations come from?

    The Implicit Association Test [1] is a sorting task which reveals something about our automatic, non-deliberate, associations [2].

    The part of the test which betrays our automatic associations is a combination of two simpler sorting tasks. Both simple tasks involve sorting words and pictures into categories which are assigned to the left and right (by pressing the E and I keys, which are on the left and right of your keyboard). One task is to sort words (like ‘love’, or ‘failure’) into the categories ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The other task varies depending on what you want to detect automatic associations about. In the ‘race IAT’ the task is to sort pictures of the faces of white americans and the faces of black americans. The race IAT isn’t the only version, but it is the most (in)famous (you can also do the IAT on fat vs thin, arab-muslim vs non-arab-muslims, for different US presidents and in many other variations). The compound task involves sorting both words and pictures to the left and right where each side has two categories assigned to it – so ‘good’ and ‘black american’ on the left, and ‘bad’ and ‘white american’ on the right, for example.

    What the IAT test does is compare your times for sorting good words when the ‘good’ side is also the ‘white’ side to when the ‘good’ side is also the ‘black’ side (and vice versa for sorting bad words, and for sorting white and black faces to the good and bad sides). By doing these comparisons the test can detect any evaluation of ‘white’ or ‘black’ as positive or negative that is affecting your time to classify the words or faces to the correct side. So, for example, if you take significantly longer to sort good words to the ‘black’ side than you do to the ‘white’ side then the result is an automatic preference for ‘white americans’ over ‘black americans’ [3]

    What the Racial IAT indicates is that most Americans have an automatic preference for whites over blacks. Two things are important about this. First it isn’t really clear what mechanisms lie behind the effects found in the test (‘Voodoo’ is one suggestion!), nor is it clear what they mean [4]. Second, the automatic preference shows up for most people, even in those who consciously express no race preferences and even in many black americans.

    Now where did this automatic preference come from? It certainly can’t be deliberate attitudes, since the bias shows up in people (including many black americans) who have explicitly anti-racist attitudes. Some suggestions have been made, like they are the residual of previously held explicit attitudes, or the result of a ‘cultural bias’ (whatever that means) [5], but I think a strong, and more likely causal [6], possibility is that that these preferences are the result of systematic exposure to particular associations (i.e that white = good and black = bad). Associations can become established in memory merely by the repeated co-presentation of two things (conditioning), there doesn’t need to be any logical connection between the two. So if on television the adverts for flash cars and happy domestic scenes always feature white folks and the the crime shows more often have black folks as the bad guys you’re going to absorb those associations.

    The researchers running the project imply as much in an answer in their FAQ


    …it is very possible to possess an automatic preference that you would rather not have (and the researchers who developed this test are convinced that they, too, fall into this category). One solution is to seek experiences that could undo or reverse the patterns of experience that could have created the unwanted preference. But this is not always easy to do. A more practical alternative may be to remain alert to the existence of the undesired preference, recognizing that it may intrude in unwanted fashion into your judgments and actions. Additionally, you may decide to embark on consciously planned actions that can compensate for known unconscious preferences and beliefs.”

    (My emphasis).

    The interesting thing for me about the hypothesis that these automatic preferences develop from repeated exposure to particular associations is that you do not need to believe the associations on any deliberate level, nor do you need particularly to pay attention to them, all you need to do is to have them as part of your environment. In that way our Implicit Associations reflect a part of our minds which belongs as much to the environment of our experience as to ourselves – and, additionally, is as much common to everyone who has shared our environment as it is unique to our individual minds.

    And this relates to advertising. Adverts are ubiquitous. Advertising shapes the statistical content of the stimuli we are exposed too, however much we decide to give ourselves certain experiences. Does the IAT give us a glimpse of the consequences we reap from an unclean mental environment? [7]

    References below the fold

    Continue reading “where do implicit associations come from?”