2009 – Page 30 – Mind Hacks

Moses extreme reactions

Some statistical tests with wonderful names. From SPSS, one of the standard data analysis software packages used by psychologists.

Kendall’s W
Cochran’s Q
LSD post-hoc
Two-step cluster
Fisher’s exact test
Wald-Wolfowitz runs
Moses extreme reactions

UPDATE: Thanks to everyone who has added to our list of wonderfully named statistical tests used by psychologists. Grabbed from the comments, they include:

Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference
Smoothed Bootstrap
Jackknife Variance
Roy’s Largest Root

Psychologists central to war on terror interrogations

The Washington Post has an article exploring recently released ‘war on terror’ interrogation memos, showing that “psychologists, physicians and other health officials” played a key part in interrogations widely condemned as torture.

It’s an interesting revelation because during the long debates, and some say heal-dragging, over whether the American Psychological Association should ban its members from participation, one of their main arguments was that psychologists should participate to prevent any unethical behaviour.

Instead, it looks like the presence of psychologists and other health officials was used to justify the interrogations as reasonable, despite the fact that the Red Cross’s condemnation of techniques as “tantamount to torture” has now been justified by the release of official documents.

Their names are among the few details censored in the long-concealed Bush administration memos released Thursday, but the documents show a steady stream of psychologists, physicians and other health officials who both kept detainees alive and actively participated in designing the interrogation program and monitoring its implementation. Their presence also enabled the government to argue that the interrogations did not include torture.

Most of the psychologists were contract employees of the CIA, according to intelligence officials familiar with the program….

The CIA dispatched personnel from its office of medical services to each secret prison and evaluated medical professionals involved in interrogations “to make sure they could stand up, psychologically handle it,” according to a former CIA official.

The alleged actions of medical professionals in the secret prisons are viewed as particularly troubling by an array of groups, including the American Medical Association and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The documents apparently describe instances where psychologists guided interrogations and provided information about mental weakness of detainees so they could be specifically exploited by interrogators.

Link to WashPost on ‘Psychologists Helped Guide Interrogations’.

Mad, Bad and Sad: A Historical Romance

Lisa Appignanesi’s book Mad, Bad and Sad: A History of Women and the Mind Doctors from 1800 to the Present is a romantic tour through the last 200 years of psychiatry and the feminine, although probably not in the sense you’re thinking of.

The romantic movement was a literary and artistic phenomena that emerged in the 1800s as a backlash to the rationalism of the enlightenment. They railed against science as a dehumanising force, although this view was not its most lasting legacy.

Perhaps the biggest impact of the romantic movement was to seed the idea that the scientific and the humane were contradictory and incompatible, suggesting that it is not possible to be both scientific and compassionate, rational and poetic, or objective and understanding at the same time.

These are the two cultures, of which C. P. Snow famously spoke, and applied to the mind the romantic view suggests that an interpretative psychology touches the very core of our humanity, whereas the empirical barely scratches the surface.

It’s a false dichotomy because we are neither the facts of biology nor the feelings of the mind. We are at all times, both. Each is just a shadow of the whole that, paradoxically, has no single identity.

The colours of romanticism run through Appignanesi’s book, who hails from a cadre of the feminist literati who have become respected psychoanalytic thinkers. As she notes in her book, heavyweights like Julia Kristeva and Juliet Mitchell were literature PhDs before training as analysts, and although Appignanesi maintains a critical distance, the same vein runs through her work.

This is most apparent in her explorations of the lives of famous women who have shaped our ideas about the feminine and mental illness. It is Freudian literary analysis which forms the backbone of personal explanations in the book, as each person’s inner life is poetically explored without significant recourse to other ways of interpreting their motivations and desires.

It is also the case, however, that this period of history is the most gripping of the book, not least because it features the players for which Appignanesi has the most passion, but also because of her careful historical work, weaving the developments in the understanding of the mind to the social, to the personal, and back again.

But it is not the focus on the poetic psychologies that gives the book its romantic tone, so much the coldness for science which most clearly shows itself as the book rolls on to the present.

This is partly reflected in the numerous minor neglectful errors that pop up in the final section: atypical antipsychotics are described as have ‘far fewer side-effects’ than the older types when we’ve known this not to be the case for many years; the ‘diazepams’ are described as a drug class when diazepam is a single specific medication; cognitive therapy is described as being based on an ‘underlying assumption that people are rational beings and ever-capable of self-assessment, without any self-deception’ when it is based, and always has been, on exactly the opposite premise.

With this section also comes unconcealed hostility for new evidence-based methods of mental health: psychometric tests are dismissed as ‘fun as parlour games’, cognitive therapy is bizarrely accused of being akin to ‘brainwashing’ and standardised questionnaires as pathologising teenagers.

The fact that these could be the effective tools of humane and sensitive clinicians seems almost impossible in this light. The rise of science in psychological treatment is portrayed as antagonistic to empathy and the true work of understanding the soul, when, in fact, they are complementary to it.

The likes of Elaine Showalter’s Hystories does not share this romantic slant, and manages to remain more broad in its overview, although is more limited in its scope.

But despite the slant, I found Mad, Bad and Sad both powerful and enlightening, gripping in places, and compelling in many of its arguments.

It is perhaps, the best romantic history of psychiatry available, although, it is not as purely historical as it claims.

Link to book details.

2009-04-17 Spike activity

Quick links from the past week in mind and brain news:

The neuroscience of envy and schadenfreude is explored by Pure Pedantry.

The Economist has an article on connectomics and the project to create a complete white matter map of the brain.

Panic! The Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology has an article on drinking on your 21st birthday. Extremely extreme apparently.

O’Reilly Radar has an interesting piece on navigating robots that run on the power of cute.

To the bunkers! US Military wants to offload ‘deep learning’ to computers according to Wired.

What can stage magic tell us about the brain? Asks Science News.

CNN thinks naltrexone is from “a new generation of anti-addiction drugs”. If by new generation they mean from 1974, then yes, they’re right.

Are smart drugs the answer to bad moods and a bad economy? ask Discover Magazine. I’m sure you can guess the answer to that one.

Neurotopia has an excellent piece on the neuroscience of amphetamine.

Research on a ‘video game’ that reduces aggression is covered by Cognitive Daily. Not really a video game, but fascinating research nonetheless.

Medical News reports that increases in psychotic symptoms are more likely to make the person a victim of violence than a perpetrator.

Mind Hacks gets a write-up from Gehirn & Geist magazine. Sadly, I can’t read a word of German but I have it on good authority that it is very flattering (thanks Rich!).

Stanford Magazine has an interview with Henry Greely, co-author of the recent Nature article on why cognitive enhancing drugs should be legally available.

A simple psychological intervention that boosts school performance of ethnic minority students is discussed by The BPS Research Digest.

Eric Schwitzgebel mulls whether scientific ideas about moral development are inherently politically biased.

Epilepsy drug valproate during pregnancy can lower babies IQ, reports The New York Times.

Another from The New York Times: “There are no rules of etiquette for dealing with a person who has a neurological disorder.” Short personal piece on Parkinson’s disease.

The Frontal Cortex has a good piece on the neuroscience of admiration and why Twitter won’t make you immoral.

Psychologist Jesse Bering takes a tour through quirky studies on the effects of alcohol in Scientific American.

A classification of royal stalkers

A fascinating new study on the types of people who stalk or harass the British Royal Family has just been published online by the journal Psychological Medicine.

A group of forensic psychologists examined, by hand, twenty thousand files held by SO14, the Metropolitan Police Service’s Royalty Protection unit, to study people who had made inappropriate approaches or communications with the British royals.

This is the classification of harassers and stalkers by motivation:

Delusions of Royal Identity (i.e. pretenders to the throne or to royal kinship). This was the largest group, accounting for 67 cases (26.9%). Seventeen (6.8%) expressed delusional beliefs that they were the true sovereign. This group often wrote lengthy letters accompanied by family trees and multiple annotated documents in support of their claims. Claims of kinship to the sovereign were made by a further 50 (20.1% of the whole sample). There was often evidence in their writings of complex delusional systems.

Amity Seekers were the 41 (16.5%) subjects who offered their friendship and advice, which they expected to be taken, apparently oblivious to the unrealistic nature of their endeavour.

The Intimacy Seekers consisted of 30 (12%) individuals. Fourteen (5.6%) had clearly erotomanic preoccupations, 10 of whom were male. All expressed the conviction that they were loved by or already married to their royal target. Those who were infatuated but not clearly erotomanic (16; 6.4%) usually wished to express their love or offer their hand in marriage to a royal. They understood that the royal personage did not yet love them or even know of their existence, but they still expressed confidence that they would succeed in their suit.

Sanctuary and Help Seekers made up 22 (8.8%) of the sample and were asking for royal assistance with personal adversity or royal protection from supposed persecutors.

The Royally Persecuted were a small group of only eight (3.2%) subjects, who claimed to be victims of organized persecution orchestrated by a member of the Royal Family.

Counsellors who, though similar in some ways to the Amity Seekers, were a group of 28 (11.2%) individuals who saw it as their role to offer advice and opinions to the Royal Family on how they should live their lives and respond to political situations.

Querulants formed a group of 16 (6.4%) people who were pursuing a highly personalized quest for justice and vindication. They were seeking royal assistance with their claims, or complaining of royal indifference to their cause.

The Chaotic comprised a group of 37 cases (14.9%), where no clear motivation could be assigned because their writings and/or their statements to police were so difficult to follow or understand. It was not that there was insufficient information to assign another category. Rather, their thought processes and behaviour were so disturbed as to make a singularity of purpose unlikely.

The most famous stalker of the British Royal Family was probably Klaus Wagner, a German ex-doctor who believed that the Queen was the beast prophesised in Revelations and that Princess Diana was being persecuted by the Royal Family.

He was eventually sent to jail for stalking Diana, and apparently remained on his quest to defeat the ‘Elizardbeast’ until his death in 2007.

Wagner came to prominence in a controversial UK TV documentary called I’m Your Number One Fan that featured three stalkers of high profile celebrities. It used to be available on the net but has since disappeared, although occasionally turns up on torrent servers.

Interestingly, one of the first cases of what we now call erotomania or de Cl√©rambault’s syndrome, the delusional belief that another person – usually of higher status – is in love with you, featured the British Royal Family.

de Cl√©rambault described the case of a 53 year old French woman who believed King George V was in love with her and would interpret twitches in the curtains of Buckingham Palace as secret love signals from the monarch.

Link to study.
Link to PubMed entry for same.

Head first into brain scanner technology

Nature has a great open-access article on the technology of MRI neuroimaging, responsible for the majority of ‘brain scans’ that are used in medical examinations, scientific studies and media reports.

Understanding the technology of MRI scanners is not just of interest to medtech geeks, it is essential to be able to interpret and design brain imaging studies.

We tend to think that all brain scanners do the same thing, but comparing raw data across just two scanners can be a big problem.

Imagine if there were two different ways of measuring the layout of a room, one involving placing paper squares on the floor and another by tying string between all the objects. The conclusions might be similar but trying to merge all the raw results into one big data set would be a pain.

A similar problem affects researchers using brain scanners, because manufacturers may use different magnetic pulse sequences, different coils, different processing software and have to tweak the settings for each individual installation.

As a consequence, various studies are now developing ways (mainly data processing algorithms) to ensure that even relatively simple procedures, like structural scans, can be reliably compared across different scanners.

But even using just one scanner, it’s important to know what the technology is doing because this determines what aspects of the body’s physiology it measures.

The Nature article focuses on the latest developments in MRI scanner technology but also functions as a great brief guide to how scanner go from magnetic coils to measuring brain activity.

Link to Nature on ‘How to get ahead in imaging’ (via @mocost).

The myth of sex addiction

Finally, a sceptical take on sex addiction. The Times just published an excellent article examining the problem with the concept of being ‘addicted to sex’, something that has almost entirely been an invention of private treatment clinics and the media.

There is virtually no published research on ‘sex addiction’ and it isn’t an officially recognised diagnosis, but it has become fashionable to describe compulsive or non-mainstream sexual tendencies in these terms.

Partly, as the article notes, because addiction has become the 21st century’s label of choice for people who want to medicalise less acceptable sexual behaviours, especially when someone gets ‘caught in the act’.

Dr Philip Hopley, an addiction specialist at the Priory Hospital at Roehampton, southwest London, and a consultant psychiatrist for LPP Consulting, says that public scepticism is ‚Äúunderstandable‚Äù. He says: ‚ÄúThe major concern is where sex-related problem behaviour is labelled an ‚Äòaddiction’ when in fact poor decision-making and/or impulse control lie at the root of the problem. What constitutes normal, average or healthy sex? There is no recommended limit for adults as there is for, say, alcohol – and if there was, would it be different for males and females?‚Äù

Phillip Hodson, a Fellow of the British Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy, points out that the whole idea of having an addiction to a natural drive is problematic. ‚ÄúThe excuse, of course, is that nature wants us to have sex to make babies and isn’t bothered about rationing the drive. It’s the same with eating. You cannot really be ‚Äòaddicted’ to normal drives. What’s the cure – to stop procreating or eating?‚Äù Yet perhaps one can’t really blame people for using the term ‚Äúaddiction‚Äù, because compulsivity or mania don’t have quite the same ring. ‚ÄúSex maniac‚Äù sounds like something out of a Carry On film.

The media love sex addiction and go to great lengths to quote media-hungry rent-a-quotes who can make it sound valid.

Unfortunately, the media tends to like people who have already media connections, and so the dissenting voices barely get a byline.

This article is interesting because it is written by Jed Mercurio, a TV drama writer currently researching a book on JFK, so he’s prime ‘get in the papers’ material.

Interestingly though, he used to be a doctor, and knows a fadish medical concept when he sees one. Hence we get a rare sceptical look at a current media obsession.

Link to ‘JFK, Russell Brand and the myth of sex addiction’.

Hemispheres of influence

Discover Magazine has an interesting Carl Zimmer article on one of the most intriguing questions in neuroscience – why do we have two cortical hemispheres? And why are they not quite the same?

It turns out that the ‘brain of two halves’ is incredibly common in the animal kingdom and that many creatures also show the behavioural lateralisation that we most readily see in humans as someone being left or right handed.

But it’s no entirely sure why we, or indeed, or animal compatriots, have evolved this way, although various theories are kicking around:

David Stark of Harvard Medical School recently found additional clues about lateralization in his studies of 112 different regions in the brains of volunteers. He and his collaborators discovered that the front portions of the brain are generally less tightly synchronized across the hemispheres than are the ones in the back. It may be no coincidence that the highly synchronized back regions handle basic functions like seeing.

To observe the world, it helps to have unified vision. At the front of the hemispheres, in contrast, we weave together streams of thought to produce complex, long-term plans for the future. It makes sense that these areas of the brain would be more free to drift apart from their mirror-image partners.

Zimmer goes on to puncture the myth of ‘left brained’ and ‘right brained’ people, or indeed, thinking styles, erroneously labelled with these pseudoscientific terms.

While certain cognitive styles have been correlated to greater activation in the left or right hemisphere, to describe a whole class of problems of thinking methods like this is nonsensical because the two hemispheres of the brain work together.

It’s like claiming someone is a good cook solely because they come from Italy. The generalisation is so broad it just doesn’t apply to individual people or situations.

Anyway, the Discover article is an excellent whistle-stop tour through the curious world of brain lateralisation.

Link to Discover on the brain of two hemispheres (via @mocost).

Microchip-in-a-pill drug monitoring

Furious Seasons covers a new microchip-in-a-pill that monitors the stomach and detects what drugs the patient is taking, reporting back to the doctor in real time.

The blurb from the company is even more astounding:

Proteus ingestible event markers (IEMs) are tiny, digestible sensors made from food ingredients, which are activated by stomach fluids after swallowing. Once activated, the IEM sends an ultra low-power, private, digital signal through the body to a microelectronic receiver that is either a small bandage style skin patch or a tiny device insert under the skin. The receiver date- and time-stamps, decodes, and records information such as the type of drug, the dose, and the place of manufacture, as well as measures and reports physiologic measures such as heart rate, activity, and respiratory rate.

Like Phil Dawdy, I feel a bit freaked out.

This is interesting for psychiatry for two reasons: one, monitoring for recreational drug or alcohol use and two, monitoring compliance with antipsychotics.

Both of these are interesting because these are both controversial legal areas, in that a court can impose an order or conditions that depend on a clean drug screen, and, thanks to the UK’s new ‘now with added coercion’ 2007 Mental Health Act psychiatrists can impose community treatment orders.

This means that a patient can be returned to hospital, against their will, if they’re found not to be complying with their prescribed medication regime. And as involuntary treatment is most commonly imposed on people with psychosis, this usually means taking antipsychotics.

You can see how this technology would be of great use on the monitoring end, but as it supposedly reports on any sort of drug, presumably personal drug use then becomes a data privacy issue.

In other words, you’d have to trust the information technology system to correctly discard the results that you don’t want your doctor to see.

More concerning perhaps is ‘rights slippage’ which is a pervasive problem is psychiatry.

This is the same problem that occurs when a psychiatrist (and thanks to the UK’s new Mental Health Act, now a psychologist) says to a patient who is in hospital of their own free will: “If you leave, I’ll section you”. Essentially, you’re free to go, but if you try, I’ll legally detain you.

You can see how this new technology could be used for similar strategies – if you let us monitor your drug use and medication compliance, we won’t use impose any involuntary treatment, but if you don’t, we will.

For people who voluntarily and knowingly decide to use the monitoring device, you can see how it would be a huge medical benefit, but in psychiatry, where involuntary treatment is possible, the ethical difficulties are amplified.

Also, I don’t think I need to explain the ironies of potentially implanting microchip monitoring devices into people with psychosis who often have delusions about being implanted with microchip monitoring devices.

Link to Furious Seasons microchip drug monitors.
Link to manufacturers website.

Sixty miniature heads used in phrenology

This is a wonderful image of a 1831 set of sixty miniature heads used to demonstrate the principles of phrenology from the Science Museum in London.

The science museum has a page dedicated to the set, which comes in a wonderful wooden display case, that also includes some other images and information about the exhibit.

Phrenology originated with Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), a German physician, assisted by his colleague, Johann Kaspar Spurzheim (1809-72). Phrenologists believed that the shape and size of various areas of the brain (and therefore the overlying skull) determined personality.

Gall and Spurzheim eventually disagreed and went on to promote rival systems of phrenology. These heads are numbered according to Spurzheim‚Äôs classification. The heads may have been used to teach phrenology but were probably made as a general reference collection.

A wide range of different heads are present. For instance, head number 54 is that of a scientific man; head number 8 is recorded as the head of an ‚Äòidiot‚Äô. The heads were made by William Bally, who studied under Spurzheim from 1828 onwards.

Link to Science Museum exhibit page (via the wonderful <a href"Fortean Times).

The mind of the condemned

How do you cope on death row? In 1962 two psychiatrists were puzzled by the fact that inmates condemned to death in New York’s notorious Sing Sing prison were not overwhelmed by depression or anxiety. They wrote an article for the American Journal of Psychiatry attempting to explain how 13 prisoners managed the fear of their imminent demise.

It’s an uncomfortable and ill-fitting article in many ways. The two psychiatrists are firmly psychoanalytic in their approach, talking of ‘ego defense’ and ‘projective tests’, which seems odd to the modern forensic eye.

Moreover, the liberal use of the contemptuous language of sixties psychiatry pervades the article. The inmates are described variously as “inadequate”, “obsessed with his own power”, “mentally dull”, “self-pitying”, as if these were facts of the world, rather than the disdainful opinions of two comfortably employed prison psychiatrists.

Disturbingly, several of the condemned prisoners are clearly psychotic, and their madness is invariably explained away as a ‘defense mechanism’, little more than a tool for managing their anxieties.

But despite the filtering and selective reporting, it is possible to catch a glimpse of how the inmates managed their lives as the condemned.

This man stands out in the series as being the one who most successfully employed intellectualization as a means of defending against anxiety and depression. He elaborated a philosophy of life and values in which his own criminal career became not only justifiable, but even respectable. He rationalized his crimes by emphasizing the hypocrisy and perfidy of society on the one hand and by comparing himself with policemen and soldiers and others who live honorably ‚Äúby the gun‚Äù on the other. This system was so effective for him that even when execution appeared imminent he maintained his hero‚Äôs martyr role and disdained to request executive clemency.

Of course, we will all die, and in recent years studies on how we live with this knowledge, so called ‘mortality salience’ or ‘terror management theory’ (TMT) research, has become a fertile field of investigation.

Research suggests that when reminded of our own death, we attempt to make ourselves feel better by aligning ourselves more closely with our social groups, cultural values and intimate partners.

But to my knowledge, only one other study has investigated how death row inmates deal with their forthcoming death.

In 2008, two Dutch psychologists, Andreas Schuck and Janelle Ward, analysed the final statements of those executed by the state of Texas to examine how they portrayed themselves and made sense of their situation.

In line with ‘terror management theory’ the majority of the last statements attempted to align the subject with our society’s notion of a ‘good’ person, often in a common pattern or sequence:

subject [reference to the self]; addresses relevant relationships (from closest to furthest); expresses internal feelings (love, hate); defines situation (responsibility, acceptance versus innocence, political statement, denial); deals with situation (self-comfort, religion, wish/hope, forgiveness, self-blame vs. accusation, denial); closure.

It seems that from the prisoner to the public, death makes us conform, and even those who may have been the most callous of killers want to be a good person when they die.

Link to 1962 death row article.
Link to PubMed entry for same.
Link to study on Texas executions last words.

Easter psychology research

I’ve just found an entry for a delightful looking study on PubMed entitled ‘Size of Easter egg drawings before and after Easter’.

Unfortunately, the paper isn’t available electronically so we’ll never know whether the Easter egg drawings grew, shrunk and stayed the same over the Easter holiday.

However, we do know from a 1993 study that the famous rabbit / duck ambiguous picture is more likely to be recognised as a rabbit during Easter.

Link to entry for ‘Size of Easter egg drawings before and after Easter’
Link to entry for ‘The Easter bunny in October: is it disguised as a duck?’

The chaos of R.D. Laing

Counter-culture psychiatrist R.D. Laing is the patron saint of lovable rogues, although, according to an article in The Sunday Times, he was a hard man to love. “Being the son of RD Laing was neither amazing nor enlightening,” wrote his son in a biography of his father, “for most of the time it was a crock of shit.”

Inspired by existential philosophers, Laing produced a series of humane and revolutionary books during the sixties that argued that we undervalue both the experience of mental illness and those who are mentally ill.

Madness, he argued, was a transformative experience, rich with personal meaning, that functions like an existential rite of passage. Delusions and hallucinations were the expression of the unmentionable, illustrating the emotional double-booking keeping of the family with an unignorable tear in the fabric between the conscious and unconscious mind.

When you talk to psychiatrists from Laing’s generation, they are rarely complementary. The fact he fuelled the ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement (unwittingly, he claimed) is secondary to the fact that they chiefly remember his decline from a brilliant thinker to a tacky drunk.

While his public persona was just saddening, his family life was frequently shattered by his emotional instability. Fathering 10 children by four different women, the Times article recounts how his children remember his emotional neglect, sometimes punctuated with violence.

Yet Laing remains fascinating. Partly we revel in the irony as he highlighted the naivety of his own theories – his depression and alcoholism were hardly a rite of passage, and he embodied the dark force of ambivalent family turmoil that he railed against in his writing.

But partly it’s because he reflects those times when our inadequacies get the better of how we want the world to be. To borrow from Jung, he is the archetypal wounded healer, a modern day Fisher King whose wounds destroyed his kingdom.

Link to Sunday Times article ‘RD Laing: The abominable family man’.

The future of targeted memory manipulation

Wired Science has an interesting interview with Oxford neuroethicist Anders Sandberg about the future of drugs that can reduce the emotional impact of traumatic memories.

The interview uses the term ‘memory editing’ which is not a great label for these drugs, such as beta-blocker propranolol, which largely work by reducing the emotional ‘kick’ stored with a memory of a painful or traumatic experience when taken after the experience or during recall.

This is something that is often misreported by the mainstream media who often starting going off on one about ‘memory erasing’ drugs and the like.

However, it is also not true that propranolol solely effects the emotional aspects. Careful reading of the studies show that people treated with the compound do typically show a slight reduction in their actual memory for traumatic events.

But the interview makes the interesting point that maybe we’re a bit too focused on removing or reducing memories, the problem of inducing false memories is probably more serious:

Wired.com: I’ve asked about memory removal ‚Äî but should the discussion involve adding memories, too?

Sandberg: People are more worried about deletion. We have a preoccupation with amnesia, and are more fearful of losing something than adding falsehoods.

The problem is that it’s the falsehoods that really mess you up. If you don’t know something, you can look it up, remedy your lack of information. But if you believe something falsely, that might make you act much more erroneously.

You can imagine someone modifying their memories of war to make them look less cowardly and more brave. Now they’ll think they’re a brave person. At that point, you end up with the interesting question of whether, in a crisis situation, they would now be brave.

Link to ‘The Messy Future of Memory-Editing Drugs’.

Old skool lie detectors

OObject has a fantastic online gallery of vintage analog ‘lie detectors’ – exactly the type of kit you used to see in old detective films where the police questions would lead to frantic activity on the polygraph as a bead of sweat would run down the perp’s face.

It has everything from a tiny 1920s original MacKenzie-Lewis polygraph to the lie detector in a suitcase Pentograph from the 1980s

Despite polygraph-based lie detectors being rubbish at detecting lies, they’re still admissible as evidence in some US states and widely used by the security services.

Link to gallery of vintage lie detectors (via BB Gadgets).

Involuntary masturbation in alien hand syndrome

I’ve just found this fascinating case study in American Journal of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation about a man who lost conscious control over one of his hands after brain injury and suffered involuntary public masturbation episodes as a result.

Involuntary masturbation as a manifestation of stroke-related alien hand syndrome

Ong Hai BG, Odderson

Am J Phys Med Rehabil. 2000 Jul-Aug;79(4):395-8.

Alien hand syndrome is a perplexing and uncommon clinical diagnosis. We report an unusual manifestation of alien hand syndrome in a 73-yr-old man with a right anterior cerebral artery infarct affecting the right medial frontal cortex and the anterior portion of the corpus callosum. We conclude that alien hand syndrome should be considered in patients who present with a feeling of alienation of one or both upper limbs accompanied by complex purposeful involuntary movement.

We tend to think of the cognitive impairments after brain injury as the most disabling – things like loss of memory or speech or language impairment, but we often neglect what we might call social impairments.

Especially when the effect is embarrassing, these can have just as strong an impact because many people massively restrict their lives to prevent causing social discomfort to themselves or others.

Link to PubMed entry for study.